Factors influencing the Internationalisation of Firms: Micro Foundations of Macro Determinants by Pitelis, Christos & Argitis, George
    DYNREG   
  Dynamic Regions in a Knowledge- 
          Driven Global Economy 





















                                                              
Factors influencing the 
Internationalisation of Firms: Micro 
Foundations of Macro Determinants 





































36  / 2009        
WORKING PAPERS   1 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF FIRMS:  
MICRO FOUNDATIONS OF MACRO DETERMINANTS 
 
 
Christos Pitelis, University of Cambridge, UK* 
George Argitis, University of Crete 
 
 
*Christos Pitelis,  
Centre for International Business and Management (CIBAM),  
Judge Business School,  
University of Cambridge,  
Trumpington Street,  
Cambridge CB2 1AG,  
UK 
Tel: 0044 1223 339618 





Short running title: Determinants of Internationalisation 
   2 
Abstract 
We draw on insights from the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) to explain outward 
investment  and  (thus)  internationalisation.  We  claim  that  micro  insights  from  the  work  of 
Stephen  Hymer,  Edith  Penrose  and  other  extant  theories  of  the  MNE  can  serve  as  micro 
foundations  of  some  macro  determinants  of  internationalisation.  The  focus  on  macro 
determinants pursues and develops an earlier critique of the theory of the MNE by Penrose; that 
it fails to distinguish between intra-national and inter-national expansion of firms. We propose 
demand-side  national  business  cycle  considerations  as  a  Penrose-inspired  answer  to  the 
Penrosean critique. Our evidence derives from USA and UK data, supports insights from Hymer, 
Vernon, Penrose and our response to the Penrosean challenge. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Penrose (1987) criticized Hymer and Coase-based theories of the MNE for failing to distinguish 
between intra-national and inter-national expansion. The latter (internationalisation), in her view, 
is best explained in terms of differences between nations vis-à-vis their regulatory frameworks 
and  other  inter-national  differences.  The  Penrosean  challenge  to  extant  theory  has  not  been 
answered. It calls for a macroeconomic approach to the determinants of internationalisation. The 
critical question, in this context, is to what extent extant theory of the MNE (including Penrose’s 
own views) is of some input to answering why internationalisation. We claim that it does have an 
important input. We try to determine this by critically assessing and synthesizing extant theory of 
the MNE and then extending the result by invoking macroeconomic demand and business-cycle-
related considerations of help to delineating between different nations. We use macroeconomic 
determinants that are derived from insight from extant theory and our extension, and test this for 
the case of outward investment from the USA and the UK . 
 
Structure-wise, Section II critically assesses extant theory of the MNE; Section III integrates and 
extends the outcome; Section IV provides new evidence and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Extant Theory of the MNE 
 
In  his  PhD  thesis,  completed  in  1960  and  published  in  1976,  Stephen  Hymer  posed  the 
fundamental  question,  why  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  versus  alternative  modalities  of 
foreign operations like, for example, licensing, tacit collusion, strategic alliances and the like.   4 
This is of course the famous Coasean question, applied to the case of FDI and the MNE. It is the 
question why internalize - a verb that Hymer used already in his 1960 thesis, see below. In this 
sense Hymer was the first  ‘internalization’ scholar, for the case of the MNE. 
 
In his thesis, Hymer distinguished between FDI and portfolio investment in terms of the higher 
degree of control conferred to the firm through FDI. The choice of FDI versus, for example, 
licensing was explained in terms of ‘reduction of conflict’ in international markets, benefits from 
exploiting monopolistic advantages intra-firm rather than inter-firm and ‘risk diversification’. 
From  the  three  reasons  Hymer  felt  the  last  to  be  least  important  because  it  did  not  involve 
control. 
 
Already in 1960, Hymer paid particular attention to the reasons why intra-firm exploitation of 
monopolistic  advantages  was  more  profitable  when  intra-firm,  rather  than  inter-firm.  These 
involved the absence of suitable licensees (in today’s terms thin or absent markets), different 
honest  or  dishonest  perceptions  of  the  advantage  (in  today’s  terms  ‘opportunistic’  and  non-
opportunistic  perception  of  the  advantage’s  value)  the  possibility  of  post-contract  bilateral 
oligopoly or monopoly problems (Hymer, 1976, pp. 12-29). 
 
All the above sound very modern - some very ‘internalization’-like. Following the emergence of 
the ‘internalization’ (due to transaction costs) perspective, notably by Buckley and Casson (1976) 
and  Williamson  (1981),  there  has  been  some  controversy  as  to  whether  Hymer  pre-dated 
‘internalization’ or not. Kindleberger (2002), Hymer’s PhD thesis supervisor, claimed that the   5 
new theories simply elaborate on ideas already in Hymer’s thesis, others have claimed that in the 
thesis itself Hymer focused on structural market failures at the expense of natural (transaction-
costs related) market failures (notably Dunning and Rugman, 1985). 
 
There  is  clearly  no  question  that  already  in  the  thesis  Hymer  posed  the  ‘why  internalize’ 
question, indeed in these very terms: “The firm is a practical devise which substitutes for the 
market. The firm internalizes or supersedes the market”. (Hymer, 1976, p. 48)
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Despite the ‘quote’, transaction-costs-type theorizing in the thesis was minimal, so at the time 
Dunning and Rugman’s (1985) claim was in essence right. The unearthing of Hymer’s (1968) 
article (in French) where he used Coase’s transaction costs approach as extant theory of the firm, 
alongside  more  traditional  oligopoly  theory,  led  in  turn  to  claims  by  Casson  (1990),  and 
Horagushi  and  Toyne  (1990)  that  Hymer  clearly  predated  transaction-costs/internalization 
analysis. For Horagushe and Toyne “the genesis of transaction costs as applied to the MNE can 
be traced to Hymer.”(1990, p. 487) 
 
This claim is now rather uncontroversial. In the 1968 paper, Hymer has explained both horizontal 
integration and vertical integration, along, explicitly, Coasean lines, indeed predating much of 
Williamson-type arguments, to include much of the jargon (e.g., specific assets, dishonest (today 
opportunistic) licensees, etc.) - all these are detailed in Pitelis (2002). Importantly, however,   6 
Hymer, went further in the 1968 article, also explaining FDI in terms of the speed advantages on 
intra-firm transfer of knowledge - an argument quite resource-based in nature, and reminiscent of 
Kogut and Zander’s (1993) ‘evolutionary theory of the MNE’. 
 
In subsequent contributions, Hymer (1970, 1972, 1979) built-upon and extended his earlier ideas, 
to explain the ‘macro cosm’ (of international political economy or in his terms ‘multinational 
corporate capital’) in terms of the ‘micro cosm’ (of the MNE). In addition, Hymer (1970, 1972) 
used product/life cycle, theorizing (a push factor for diversification and internationalization of 
firms  in  mature  industries),  proposed  an  M-form  hypothesis,  in  similar  terms  to  Oliver 
Williamson’s  (1981)  subsequent  analysis,  and  was  first  to  predict  externalization  through 
subcontracting, at the very time he was observing internalization and growing hierarchies. An 
important question is how does this impressive record relate to his analytical framework. 
 
Hymer’s analytical framework was simple yet powerful. For Hymer firms pursue high profits. 
For products with high fixed costs, the more you sell the higher is the profit margin - this is an 
incentive to grow (eventually to internationalize). There are constraints, however. Expanding 
abroad involves costs (the now famous costs of being foreign). To offset these costs firms need 
monopolistic advantages. They derive these in the context of growing domestically (in the US). 
For Hymer the M-form, organization retained profits, and eventually, multinationality per-se are 
such monopolistic advantages (Hymer, 1970, 1972). 
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Through its control potential, FDI is a powerful means of cross-border expansion. First, because 
of  the  intra-firm  transfer  of  advantages  already  discussed.  Second,  and  importantly,  because 
through  the  removal  of  conflict,  MNEs  could  capture  value  through  establishing  collusive 
oligopolistic conditions in foreign (and domestic) countries, but also through interpenetration of 
investments  globally.  This  would  lead  to  a  global  monopoly  situation,  a  major  source  of 
inefficiency in capitalism and a reason to replace it with something more benign. Given that a 
benefit of FDI was control, if firms could somehow retain control, but without internalizing, they 
could  choose  to  externalize,  e.g.,  outsource.  This  would  shift  the  burden  of  production  to 
subcontractors, while MNEs could maintain overall control, through, for example, ownership-
control of intangibles, such as brand names, or some tangibles examples could be the Coca-Cola 
secret recipe, the colours of Benetton etc. (in Cohen at al, 1979). 
 
Hymer’s focus on ‘value capture’ led him to underplay the issue of ‘value creation’. For example, 
even if one accepts that global collusive oligopoly will be the outcome of MNE actions, an 
important  question  is  how  efficient  was  the  process  vis-à-vis  alternatives.  If  firms  acquire 
advantages  through  efficiency,  then  these  should  be  considered.  Differently  put,  is  eventual 
global  collusive  oligopoly  that  resulted  from  efficiency-derived  advantages,  e.g.,  through 
innovation as good/bad as one without such efficiency advantages? Is it worse than ‘perfect’ 
competition without innovation? In brief, Hymer predicted a state, and ignored the nature and 
properties of the process. This is a major limitation. 
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The above pose the question whether advantages are purely monopolistic or also efficiency-
based. Interestingly, Hymer himself did not question the efficiency advantages of MNEs, yet 
chose to focus on the eventual disadvantages of the equilibrium state. Subsequent writers, such as 
Dunning (1988), correctly renamed advantages to ‘ownership’, in recognition that these can be 
both monopoly and efficiency-derived. Penrose (1959) went further in claiming that advantages 
are definitionally derived at first efficiency ones, as they result from a process of endogenous 
growth that results from knowledge and innovation within firms. She went on to claim that in 
their  attempt  to  capture  value,  firms  could  use  ‘impregnable  uses’  as  well  as  outright 
monopolistic  practices.  Thus,  the  final  state  could  be  inefficient,  but  never  the  process.  The 
potential inefficiency of any equilibrium state would call for suitable regulation by the state 
(Penrose, 1959/ Pitelis, 2004). 
 
Hymer’s  external  market  opportunity/reduction  of  conflict  (forces  of  competition)-based 
approach (also) pre-dates Porter’s (1980) contribution to competitive strategy. Both suffer from a 
difficulty to account for internal firm resources and explain endogenous growth and (thus) the 
direction of expansion. Penrose’s (1959) contribution is a natural extension and complement to 
Hymer’s.  Together they can serve as a more general theory of the firm and the MNE.
2 It is a 
great tribute to Hymer’s insight that he also predated some resource-based ideas (in Hymer, 
1968), but also explicitly built on Coase and used transaction-costs analysis (totally missing from 
Penrose). It is for these reasons too, that the two theorists together serve to provide a more 
developed analytical framework.
3   9 
 
Despite Kindleberger’s ‘attention is called to the pioneering work of Edith Penrose …’ (1984, p. 
181)
4, Penrose’s work has found little application to the theory of the MNE.   
 
One can hazard various reasons why that happened. While Penrose has spent a lot of time and 
effort analyzing MNEs (see Penrose 1956, 1968, 1985, 1987, 1995, 1996), she did not try to draw 
the links between her analysis of the theory of the growth of the firm and the MNE  itself. In part, 
this is due to her view that once up and running a subsidiary could usefully be regarded as a 
separate entity (Penrose, 1956). In addition, Kay (1999) observes, Penrose’s choice of (the oil) 
industry was not the best case study of her theory of growth, exhibiting hardly any (internal 
resource-related)  diversification  strategies.  In  addition,  Penrose’s  theory  is  arguably  more 
amenable in explaining the direction of expansion than the mode (see Kay 1999). When it comes 
to understanding the mode, transaction costs-related arguments may be indispensable. Another 
reason may be that the Penrosean approach is arguably compatible with Hymer. It complements 
the  latter  by  providing  an  endogenous  growth  theory  cum  (relatedly)  an  explanation  of  the 
direction of diversification. Other than these, the resource-based related firm specific advantages 
can be easily translated as monopolistic and/or ownership advantages.
5An important reason for 
the failure to recognise the Penrosean contribution to the issue of the MNE is that initially she 
had  refused  to  attribute  much  significance  to  the  issue  of  multinationality  per  se,  versus 
expansion  in  general.  In  most  of  her  writings,  Penrose  views  the  multinational  as  a  natural 
outcome of the process of expansion. 
   10 
In her 1987 entry to the New Palgrave, for example, she points out that ‘There are differences 
between  national  and  international  firms  but  the  differences  are  not  such  as  to  require  a 
theoretical distinction between the two types of organization, only a recognition that national 
boundaries make an empirical difference to their opportunities and costs’ (1987: 563).  
 
In the introduction to the 1995 edition of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, she suggests 
that‘ … it is easy to envisage a process of expansion of international firms within the theoretical 
framework of the growth of firms ... It is only necessary to make some subsidiary ‘empirical’ 
assumptions to analyze the kind of opportunities for the profitable operations of foreign firms 
that are not available to firms confining their activities to one country as well as some of the 
special obstacles’ (1995: xv). 
 
It is only in her very last published paper, the 1996 entry to the International Encyclopaedia of 
Business and Management, that she concedes importance to the issue of international borders. 
These, she suggests, make enough difference to ‘justify separate treatment of international firms. 
The differences arise from the additional obstacles (or advantages) relating to culture, language 
and similar considerations (which may not apply nationally within ethnically diverse countries), 
to  different  currencies,  border  controls  or  other  types  of  physical  or  financial  regulations, 
political attitudes of foreign or home governments, size of protected markets, the configurations 
of firm cultures or associations, the type of technology involved, and so on’ (1996: 1720). 
   11 
Arguably, this late recognition of the significance of national borders in requiring a separate 
treatment of the MNE explains the earlier lack of emphasis on the theoretical raison d’ être of the 
MNE.  
 
Penrose's reluctance to acknowledge any major need for separating national from international 
expansion stresses our earlier point, that the raison d’ être of the MNE should be looked at in the 
(sometimes artificial) differences that emerge from the existence of nation states. In the absence 
of these, FDI and MNEs would simply not exist, and similarly all we could only need is a theory 
of the growth of the firm.
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Having said that, it is arguable that Penrose herself did not fully provide a satisfactory reason to 
distinguish between national firms and MNEs. To this end, we claim here that demand-side, 
business-cycle-type differentials across countries may provide some answers to our concern. 
 
III. An integrated framework and the role of the business cycle 
 
Our  discussion  in  the  previous  section  affords  scope  for  synthesis  and  integration.
7  Penrose 
supplements Hymer in explaining endogenous growth, the internal generation of advantages and 
partially the direction of expansion. Hymer discusses pull and push factors for diversification. 
The various versions of transaction costs analysis explain in part the choice of mode. Dunning’s 
OLI also addresses the issue of location. Throughout the pursuit of long-term profit through   12 
innovation  and/or  monopoly  restrictions  and  oligopolistic  interaction  motivate  and  shape 
decisions and choices.  
 
Missing from this synthesis is a consideration of an important delineating factor between intra-
country and inter-country expansion. We suggest that this can be national demand-side and/or 
business-cycle  related  factors.  As  already  noted,  in  Hymer,  a  push  factor  for  domestic 
diversification is the product life cycle. Extending this reasoning, we suggest here that another 
(push and pull) factor contributing to foreign diversification can be (is) the ‘business cycle’ and 
more  specifically  differential  effective  demand-growth  related  (locational)  factors  among 
countries. This need not be the only such factor, but we claim it to be an important one. 
 
Demand-side factors can be of the push type or of the pull type, or both. On the push side, 
declining  domestic  effective  demand,  low  expected  rates  of  profitability  and  growth  can  be 
important. From the pull side, faster expected growth rates and/or profits abroad can be seen as 
locational advantages, see Dunning (1998). When the two are combined, with demand declining 
at home alongside accumulated retained profits and other ownership or monopolistic advantages, 
there remains almost no other choice. Despite the fact that such factors are often underplayed in 
the literature, demand-side considerations are often implicit in other theories and they usefully 
complement Hymer’s explanation of product-life-cycle-based domestic diversification. Explicitly 
demand-side questions from the point of view of the firm also enter Vernon’s (1966) ‘product life 
cycle’ hypothesis. In Vernon’s approach, products are seen to have a life cycle with three main 
phases: introduction and growth, maturity, and decline. In the first phase production takes place 
at home, for various reasons, such as the need for careful control and monitoring of the market. In   13 
the second phase the product becomes standardized and given that it is already somewhat known 
abroad through exports, FDI is contemplated. In the third phase, FDI becomes inevitable, as 
tariffs  tend  to  constrain  further  exports.  Scale  economies  tend  to  be  exhausted  at  home  and 
servicing foreign markets becomes very difficult.  
 
Vernon’s theory has been attacked as an inadequate account of post Second World War Two 
MNE activities, for example by Buckley and Casson (1976) on grounds such as the difficulty the 
theory has to explain non-export substituting investments, the appearance of non-standardized 
products being produced abroad and the case of carefully differentiated products to suit the local 
market. Another potential criticism of the theory is that the decline in the rate of growth of 
demand in the maturity phase can be avoided through unrelated diversification to products at a 
different phase of their cycle. In this sense, conglomeration can be seen as an answer to the 
vagaries of the product cycle, as in Hymer (1979). The aforementioned criticisms derive from the 
focus of Vernon’s approach to demand for the individual product, not aggregate demand. The 
aggregate demand deficiency argument applies to all firms, at all phases of their products, albeit 
to different degrees of severity, depending, among others, on the phase of the product cycle. FDI, 
in our framework, can be seen as firms’ reply to the vagaries of the ‘business cycle’, thus giving 
rise to a genuinely ‘all weather company’. In this sense, the aggregate demand argument goes 
beyond, and survives the criticisms of the product cycle theory. 
 
To  summarise,  demand-side,  business-cycle-related  considerations  build  on  the  tradition  and 
insights of Penrose and Hymer and provide an important distinguishing factor between domestic 
and inter-national diversification. To the extent inter-national location matters, it is almost self-  14 
evident that inter-national macro-economic, demand-related conditions will be of importance. 
However, it is not claimed here that demand-side, business-cycle-related considerations provide a 
new theory of the MNE. One needs to bring together all issues raised in this paper; failing or 




In the context of this paper, and building on Penrose, the MNE is a firm. Its explanation requires 
a  theory  of  the  growth  of  the  firm  and  limits  to  growth,  plus  a  justification  for  the  special 
importance of national state boundaries. The theory of (limits to) growth is the Penrosean one. It 
is compatible with, and complements Hymer. Both need to be complemented with transaction 
costs related arguments, in order to explain more adequately the choice of mode. Locational 
factors can be one factor that separates national from inter-national diversification. Demand-side, 
business-cycle-related  considerations  are  also  important.  They  can  be  seen  as  another  inter-
national location (dis)advantage, a pull and push factor for FDI, in firms’ pursuit of being ‘all 
weather companies’. Endogenous constraints as in Penrose, alongside oligopolistic interaction, 
can explain the limit to the growth of the MNE. 
 
To summarise, by crafting (dynamic) transaction costs and by recognising the importance of the 
national demand-side and business-cycle-related factors we can add-on the Penrose-Hymer story 
and come up with a fuller picture. This provides elements of an integrative framework and tools 
to be applied in specific cases so as to explain and/or predict the specific actions of specific 
firms.   15 
 
IV. Some new econometric evidence 
 
The conceptual value-added of the previous pages consists in the synthesis and extension of 
Hymer, Penrose and related views and the attempt to delineate more finely between intra- and 
inter-national diversification, by invoking macro-demand and business-cycle-related arguments. 
 
At one level, citing supportive evidence in favour of the above is easy. Caves (1996) cites a 
voluminous  literature  in  favour  of  transaction-costs  and  resource-based  insights,  Dunning’s 
overall work provides a wealth of evidence on advantage-related, transaction costs and locational 
factors, Kogut and Zander (1993) provide evidence if favour of Penrosean insights. Cantwell 
(2000) cites evidence in favour of the Penrose-related technological accumulation arguments. It 
could be possible to claim that taken together, the above evidence also supports the individual 
parts of our proposed synthesis. 
 
If we accept the above argument, for the time being, the question then turns to the role of demand 
and business-cycle-related factors.  
 
On the issue of demand, Pitelis (1996) provides econometric evidence for the UK, according to 
which  outward  investment  is  significantly  and  regularly  influenced  by  domestic  aggregate 
demand. Primary-questionnaire-based evidence by Iammarino and Pitelis (2000), moreover on 
FDI from Greece to Bulgaria and Romania, report that from a total of 85 direct investments, a   16 
total of 53 cited “expected economic growth” as their main motivation for investing abroad, by 
far the most popular factor. “Geographical location” was second with 31 firms citing it, with 
“investment  incentives”,  “labour  costs”,  “domestic  market  share”,  “regional  market  share”, 
“proximity to the EU”, “source of raw materials” and “cultural similarities” occupying the nest 
seven. “Transport costs”, “political and economic climate”, “country’s chance to join the EU”, 
“historical links”, “energy costs” and “labour skills” followed next. The primary data evidence is 
clearly  in  support  of  demand-side  factors  and  locational  factors,  much  in  support  of  our 
conceptual arguments. 
 
There is no attempt to our knowledge to test directly for the role of the national business cycle in 
motivating outward investment. An aim of this section is to test for such a relationship. The best 
known proxy variable for the business cycle is the unemployment rate (UR), see for example 
Rowthorn and Wells (1987) A high UR is a sign of economic decline, thus in the context of our 
arguments, a reason for outward investment. The opposite applies for the case of declining UR. 
 
Besides testing for business cycle-related arguments, the use of the UR can also allow us to test 
insights  from  Penrose’s  theory.  A  high  UR  is  a  sign  of  ‘excess  (human)  resources’,  which, 
according  to  Penrose  should  lead  to  outward  investment.  Given  this,  the  UR  tests  both  for 
Penrose’s theory and for the business-cycle argument.  
Given the above, the econometric relationship we wish to test is  
  ODIS = f (UR, Σt)  (1) 
Where ODIS is outward investment as a percentage of the GDP 
UR is the unemployment rate   17 
Σ is a vector of other relevant variables and  
t is a time subscript  
While our focus here is on UR, it is important to choose other determinants of ODIS. Based on 
the existing theory we use three more explanatory variables: the profit share (PS), strike intensity 
(NC) and the real rate of interest (IRR).
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The first two variables aim to account for ‘real’ factors, while the IRR for monetary factors. 
 
PS is an important variable derived from various theories. A high profit share proxies a high 
domestic  profit  rate,  which  implies  positive  investment  opportunities  at  home.  This  should 
discourage  outward  investment.  A  high  profit  share  is  also  a  ‘sign’  of  the  existence  of 
‘monopolistic  advantages’  (the  profit  share  can  be  seen  as  the  ‘degree  of  monopoly’  of  the 
economy, see Cowling (1982). For Hymer (but also Porter 1990), this could be seen as a factor 
contributing to outward investment. On the other hand, a high ‘degree of monopoly’ may lead to 
low  effective  demand  at  home,  thus  motivating  outward  investment.  In  all  these  effects  are 
conflicting so what we test here is for the relative strength of the conflicting effects of PS on 
ODI. 
 
Strike intensity is representative of the harmonious or conflicting relationship between business 
and labour, the existence or otherwise of ‘corporatist’ economies and, importantly, the relative 
bargaining  power  of  MNEs  and  trade  unions.  Relevant  literature  has  relied  upon  some 
conventional variables as proxies for class power. In our econometric work, we use the number   18 
of  realised  conflicts  (NC)  between  capital  and  labour.  One  would  expect  a  positive  relation 
between NC and ODI, in that political and social (in)stability leads to outward investment. Such 
a relationship is also in line with a power-based, ‘divide and rule’ interpretation, but also with a 
transaction costs-based analysis. Conflictual relationships between business and domestic labour 
can be taken to imply high intra-firm transaction costs, thus a need for dis-integration and/or 
foreign operations. Overall we expect a positive sign between NC and ODI. 
 
Our last variable. IRR, aims to test for the role of monetary factors (to include monetary policy) 
on ODI.  In general, high real interest rates imply a high cost of capital and a restrictive monetary 
policy. Both should be expected to affect positively outward investments. Assuming, as Hymer 
observed,  that  MNEs  can  borrow  abroad  anyway,  i.e.  without  undertaking  ODI,  one  could 
suggest that the main reason for a positive link between IRR and ODI would come from IRR’s 
implications for domestic demand. High IRRs imply restrictive policies, thus a reason for ODI. 
Equation 2 formalises our aforementioned arguments:  
ODIS= f(UR, CP, NC, IRR)       (2)  
The expected signs being: fur> 0; fcp?; fnc> 0; firr> 0. This specification is a hitherto untested 
equation.  We  assume  a  linear  function  and  a  stochastic  relationship  and  hence  equation  2 
including the error term that assumed to satisfy the usual assumptions results in the following 
specification. 
  ODISt = a0 + a1 URt + a2 PSt + a3 NCt + IRRt + ut  (3)
10   19 
 
Equation  3  was  tested  using  an  autoregressive  distributed  lag  (ARDL)  structure  on  31 
observations for the USA and the UK.
11 The Akaike Information and the Schwarz Bayesian 
criteria suggest that a lag structure of the model up to the first order is preferred by the data. We 
regard the ARDL (1,1,1,1,1) model as a starting point and attempt to optimise the fit for each 
country by narrowing down the number of parameters, taking the t-value as an indicator. Table 1 
(appendix 1) presents the estimated regressions preferred by the data.  
------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
 After the application of a full range of misspecification tests in the estimated regressions, which 
are reported in Table 1, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, there is no evidence of 
serial correlation, or of a rejection of the linearity, normality, homoskedasticity assumptions at 
the 5% and 1% level of significance by the standard Langrange Multiplier test. Moreover, the 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests provide no evidence of structural instability in any of the reported 
regressions. The coefficients of determination, R
2, which is 0.67 in the USA and 0.89 in the UK 
indicate a goodness of fit of our estimated regression. Our selected set of independent variables 
explains a significant part of the variation in outward investment.  
 
Our tests for the determinants of outward investment, provide support for insights by both Hymer 
and Penrose but also for our extension concerning the role of the national business cycle. In   20 
particular, all variables are significant, but the strike intensity and the real interest rate in the UK, 
and have the expected signs. The statistical significance of the lagged dependent variable in the 
UK shows the autoregressive nature of the outward investment in this case. UR was found to 
have a positive and significant effect on ODIS. The same is true for the IRR in the USA. The 
anti-inflationary monetary policies of the last two decades are likely to have increased the cost of 
business credit and debt that may have operated as a de-stabilising mechanism for domestic 
capital accumulation in the USA encouraging outward investment. The result is surprising in the 
UK. Severe re-distributional trends towards business profit and labor rationalization in the UK 
since the end of the 1970s might have compensated the higher cost of money for business, which 
seem to care more about their profit share and business cycle. A high profit share was found to 
have a negative impact on outward investment in both countries. This points to the importance of 
healthy domestic economic conditions being a disincentive for outward investment, or a pull 
factor for investing in the domestic economy. Strike intensity was found to have a positive and 
significant effect on ODIS in the USA. The variable used, the number of conflicts might also 
capture  changes  in  business  confidence  about  economic,  social  and  political  stability  that 
influence the investment climate. In the UK, the rise of Thatcherism signals the fall of trade 
unions’ militancy, a change that possibly explain the unimportance of strike intensity in business 
investment decisions.  
Our evidence is in line with existing theory and conventional wisdom, but also extends existing 
theory in new interesting directions. It also adds value by testing the theoretical insights. 
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V. Concluding remarks 
We have extended existing theories of the MNE, notably Stephen Hymer’s by making use of 
Penrosean insights, and went on to further extend the outcome. We have then tested the resulting 
theory econometrically for the case of the USA and the UK. Our results support the view that 
business cycle, and ‘excess resources’-related factors can motivate outward investment. 
 
Political and social instability, monetary austerity and a low domestic profit share are also factors 
that may lead firms to undertake outward investment. All these are both in line with, and confirm, 
existing theory and conventional wisdom. They add empirical weight on an issue where evidence 
is rather scarce and shed empirical light on firm motives to go abroad. 
 
There is an interesting, albeit hardly revolutionary, policy implication for government policy, too, 
from our evidence. If governments wish to avoid ‘capital flight’ they should strive for ‘political 
stability’  and  a  ‘healthy economic  environment’, to include healthy demand conditions. It is 
hoped  that  such  policies  will  also  be  conducive  to  attracting  inward  investment  –  which, 
however, is another paper.   22 
Endnotes 
 
1 In our mind the importance of this quote should not be overstated. It is important that the very 
way Hymer had posed the question was ‘why internalize’ (with the verb or not). As it happens, 
the use of the verb ‘internalize’ (and also the use of very Coasean terminology in the thesis) has 
led  some  scholars  to  revisit  Hymer’s  contribution  to  ‘internalization’  (e.g.,  Teece  2005, 
forthcoming). 
2 See Pitelis (forthcoming 2005) for a resource/knowledge-based OLI that integrates Hymer’s 
and Penrose’s thinking. 
3 Kindleberger (2002 or 1984), and Horagushi and Toyne (1990) have previously observed the 
need to draw on Penrosean thinking and (for the last mentioned) combine Penrose with Hymer. 
4 See, however, Cantwell (1991, 2000) who points to similarities between Penrose’s contribution 
and those of the “competitive international industry” approach to the MNE. 
5  In  contrast  to  Hymer,  Penrose  clearly  distinguished  between  monopolistic  and  non-
monopolistic advantages. She recognised the existence of both. She suggested that larger and 
older firms have a ‘competitive advantage’ over smaller firms in terms both of non-monopolistic 
advantages, such as size, experience, access to funds, etc., but also due to sheer ‘monopolistic 
power’ (1956: 64).   23 
 
6 In this context, it is interesting to note Penrose's observation - critique in her New Palgrave 
entry, of Coase (1937) and Hymer (1970)-based theories, which, in her view, fail to ‘distinguish 
the multinational corporation from domestic firms’ (1987: 562). 
7  The  need  for  synthesising  transaction  costs  to  the  resource-based  view  is  acknowledge  by 
Penrose (1996) and by Coase (personal correspondence,1999).  
8 Notably, cultural considerations to include “psychic costs” (see Dunning, 2000), and further 
aspects  of  the  “international  competitive  industry  approach”,  such  as  “technological 
accumulation” as discussed in Cantwell (2000). 
9 For source and definition of variables see appendix 2. 
10 All variables are in real terms.  
11 The ARDL approach is the most appropriate testing and estimation procedure for annual data. 
The main advantage of the ARDL approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1995; Pesaran et. al., 1996) lies 
in the fact that it can be applied irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), and this 
avoids the pre-testing problems associated with standard co-integration analysis, which requires 
the  classification  of  the  variables  according  to  their  order  of  integration.  Note  that  in  our 
specification two variables are defined in ratios (ODIS, PS) and hence are non-trended. The 
proxy we use to capture the capital-labour relationship (NC) is also a non-traded variable, while 
the real interest rate (IRR) is an I(1) variable.          24 
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Appendix 1  













ODIS= -0.83  + 0.18UR  - 0.12CS(-1)  + 0.0036NC  +  0.061IRR 





ODIS= 2.8  +  1.13ODIS(-1)  +  0.034UR  -  0.12CS 












                       USA                         UK                              
             CHI-SQ(1)=2.37       CHI-SQ(1)=2.24            
             CHI-SQ(1)=4.31       CHI-SQ(1)=4.69            
             CHI-SQ(2)=1.13       CHI-SQ(2)=8.34            
             CHI-SQ(1)=1.06       CHI-SQ(1)=0.60            
Notes :  Italic  numbers  are  t-values.  Critical  values  for  CHI-SQ  (1)  and  CHI-SQ(2)  at  5%  level  of  
significance are 3.84 and 5.99 and for CHI-SQ (1) and CHI-SQ (2) at 1% level of significance are 6.63 
and 9.21.  
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Appendix 2 
Source and Definition of Variables: 
ODIS = ODI/GDP 
PS =P/Y, where Y =P+W 
ODI = Direct Investment Abroad, IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years. 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years. 
P  =  Gross  Trading  Profits  (non-financial  corporate  sector);  CSO  Blue  Book,  UK  National 
Accounts, various years, Survey of Current Business, US Department of Business, various years. 
W  =  Wages  and  Salaries;  (non-financial  corporate  sector);  CSO  Blue  Book,  UK  National 
Accounts, various years, Survey of Current Business, US Department of Business, various years. 
UR = Unemployment Rate (OECD, Economic Indicators, 2005)   
NC = Number of Strikes and Lockouts, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2005. 
IRR = Lending Interest Rate (IMF, various years) – Inflation Rate (CPI) (IMF, various years) 
ODI, GDP, P, and W have been deflated by GDPDeflator (1995)  
 
 
 